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CAIQ-aligned vendor security questionnaire #

EthicsPortal publishes pre-filled answers to the questions procurement teams most often ask. The questionnaire is structured against the Cloud Security Alliance’s CAIQ v4 domain taxonomy — the framework most EU enterprise procurement teams use — so an evaluator can map this page directly into their existing assessment template.

This is a vendor-authored answer set, not an attestation by the CSA. The substance is what an external auditor would evaluate; the structure makes it easy to compare against vendors who have been audited.

A downloadable CSV is published at caiq-ethicsportal.csv for ingestion into procurement tools.

Last updated: 2026-08-15.

How to read this page #

Field	Meaning
Question	EthicsPortal’s restatement of the question in the CAIQ domain
Answer	Yes, No, Partially, or N/A, with qualifiers where the substance is more useful than a binary — for example No (in treatment) when a control is on the operator’s roadmap, Yes (inherited) when a sub-processor’s certification carries the control, Yes (negative) when the affirmative answer to a “does the Service do X?” question is “no, by design”, or a specific value (24 hours, 99.5% monthly, Nuremberg) where one applies
Evidence	Link to the page or document that contains the substantive answer

Where a question’s answer is operationally sensitive (privileged-access mechanics, incident-response escalation contacts, infrastructure detail beyond what is on /security/ ), the answer here is Available under NDA and is shared during procurement review. This mirrors the posture published on /trust/ .

A&A — Audit & Assurance #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
A&A-01	Are independent audit or assurance assessments performed on the Service?	No (in treatment)	ISO 27001 self-assessment is published. External audit and penetration test are planned post-revenue and disclosed openly on /trust/
A&A-02	Are audit reports available to customers?	No (in treatment)	When an independent audit or pen test is on record, scope, date, and remediation summary will be published on /trust/
A&A-03	Does the organization conduct internal information security reviews?	Yes	ISO 27001 Annex A control map maintained as the structured self-assessment; reviewed annually
A&A-04	Are compliance certifications listed publicly?	Yes	Certification status disclosed on /trust/ (none currently held; structured self-assessment in place)

AIS — Application & Interface Security #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
AIS-01	Is application security testing performed?	Yes	Brakeman, bundler-audit, importmap audit on every change (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
AIS-02	Is input validation enforced on all external inputs?	Yes	Rails framework defaults (strong parameters, output escaping); application-level checks at every controller boundary (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
AIS-03	Is encryption applied to sensitive data at rest?	Yes	Non-deterministic Rails ActiveRecord Encryption on report content, reporter identity, communications, and attachments (Security#data-encryption )
AIS-04	Is encryption applied to data in transit?	Yes	HTTPS/TLS for all connections; unencrypted HTTP redirected (Security#data-encryption )
AIS-05	Is the application protected against OWASP Top 10 risks?	Yes	Framework-level defenses (parameterized queries, CSRF, output escaping, strong parameters, encrypted attributes); static analysis (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )

BCR — Business Continuity & Operational Resilience #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
BCR-01	Is a documented business continuity plan in place?	Yes	Business continuity plan
BCR-02	Are backups encrypted?	Yes	Encrypted database dumps stored in Hetzner Object Storage; application-layer field encryption persists through the backup (Security#backups-and-restore )
BCR-03	Are backup restores tested?	Yes	Quarterly restore drill into a disposable environment. Last drill date published on Security#backups-and-restore
BCR-04	What is the recovery point objective (RPO)?	24 hours	SLA#recovery-objectives
BCR-05	What is the recovery time objective (RTO)?	4 hours	SLA#recovery-objectives
BCR-06	Is an availability target published?	Yes	99.5% monthly for covered surfaces (SLA )
BCR-07	Is geographic redundancy in place across providers?	No	Backups are stored separately from compute within Hetzner; cross-provider redundancy not in place. Trade-off stated in Risk register R-02

CCC — Change Control & Configuration Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
CCC-01	Are changes managed through a documented process?	Yes	Security#secure-development-lifecycle — every change is checked against a written pre-deploy checklist, and the automated suite plus static analysis block the deploy on failure
CCC-02	Is infrastructure managed as code?	Yes	Kamal deployment configuration version-controlled; no out-of-band production changes
CCC-03	Are production and non-production environments separated?	Yes	Production is isolated; non-production environments use synthetic fixtures only (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
CCC-04	Is there a documented vulnerability response timeline?	Yes	Critical 7 days, high 30 days, medium 90 days (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )

CEK — Cryptography, Encryption & Key Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
CEK-01	Is data at rest encrypted?	Yes	Non-deterministic Rails ActiveRecord Encryption on all sensitive fields (Security#data-encryption )
CEK-02	Is data in transit encrypted?	Yes	HTTPS/TLS; HTTP redirected
CEK-03	Are customer-managed encryption keys (BYOK) supported?	No	Deliberate architectural choice; reporter–handler key boundary and end-to-end deletion guarantees require processor-managed keys (DPA §6.11 )
CEK-04	Are passwords stored using a one-way hash?	Yes	Reporter passcodes bcrypt-hashed and non-recoverable; handler/admin authentication via magic-link plus TOTP, no plaintext password storage
CEK-05	Is encryption key management documented?	Yes	Key management follows the established Rails ActiveRecord Encryption lifecycle; keys are processor-managed and isolated from sub-processors (Security#data-encryption )

DCS — Datacenter Security #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
DCS-01	Where are data centers located?	Nuremberg, Germany (EU)	Security#infrastructure
DCS-02	Are data centers under recognized physical-security certification?	Yes (inherited)	Hetzner data centers under Hetzner’s certification scope (ISO 27001 control map A.7 )
DCS-03	Is data residency limited to the EU/EEA?	Yes (core data)	Core application data, database, and file storage in Germany. One named non-EU sub-processor (Cloudflare, marketing-site CDN only) listed on Subprocessors

DSP — Data Security & Privacy #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
DSP-01	Is a Data Processing Agreement (DPA) available?	Yes	DPA ; signed countersigned copy on request to legal@ethicsportal.eu
DSP-02	Is the Service GDPR-compliant?	Yes	Processor under GDPR Art. 28; full coverage on /directive-coverage/ and /dpa/
DSP-03	Are sub-processors publicly disclosed?	Yes	Subprocessors page lists each, with jurisdiction, purpose, and data categories
DSP-04	How long is personal data retained?	Customer-configurable	12, 24, 36, 48, or 60 months after report closure, with automatic deletion (Security#audit-and-compliance )
DSP-05	Is personal data deleted on customer request?	Yes	Within 30 days of subscription termination on written request (DPA §6.8 )
DSP-06	Is personal data minimization practiced?	Yes	Only essential fields are collected; reporter name and contact are optional. Art. 5(1)(c) GDPR (Coverage map §7 )
DSP-07	Is PII transmitted to any third party for processing?	Only to disclosed sub-processors	Subprocessors lists every recipient with the data category. No LLM or AI service is a sub-processor (DPA §6.10 )
DSP-08	Are data subjects’ rights supported?	Yes	Access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, objection (DPA §6.5 )

GRC — Governance, Risk & Compliance #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
GRC-01	Is there a published information security policy?	Yes	Information security policy
GRC-02	Is there a documented risk register?	Yes	Risk register
GRC-03	Is risk assessed periodically?	Yes	Annually and on material change (Risk register §Review-cadence )
GRC-04	Who owns information security at the organization?	Operator (named individual)	IS policy §4 , Trust#contracting-party
GRC-05	Is regulatory compliance tracked?	Yes	GDPR, Directive 2019/1937, EAA / EN 301 549 (Directive coverage map , Directive interpretations , Accessibility )

HRS — Human Resources Security #

EthicsPortal has no employees or contractors. Personnel controls below are answered N/A with the compensating arrangements — privileged-access summary available during procurement review, operator self-directed security awareness via subscribed feeds — documented on /trust/ and in ISO 27001 control map A.6 .

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
HRS-01	Are background checks performed on personnel with access to customer data?	N/A	No employees. Operator screening is verifiable through published registry information (Trust#contracting-party )
HRS-02	Is security awareness training provided to personnel?	N/A	No employees. Operator self-directed via Rails security mailing list, CVE feeds, advisory subscriptions
HRS-03	Are confidentiality agreements in place for personnel?	N/A	No employees. Customer-side confidentiality is in DPA §6.2
HRS-04	Is there a documented offboarding procedure for personnel with system access?	N/A	No employees. Customer offboarding is governed by DPA §6.8

IAM — Identity & Access Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
IAM-01	Is multi-factor authentication available for customer accounts?	Yes	TOTP-based 2FA for handler/admin accounts; reporter accounts use Case ID + bcrypt passcode (two-factor by construction) (Security#access-control )
IAM-02	Is multi-factor authentication enforced on operator accounts with production access?	Yes	Hardware-key 2FA on all operator accounts with production access (ISO 27001 A.8.2 )
IAM-03	Is role-based access control enforced?	Yes	Pundit policies enforced at every controller action; least-privilege defaults (Security#access-control )
IAM-04	Are access rights reviewed periodically?	Yes	Member-deactivation lifecycle and audit-log review (Security#member-access-and-offboarding )
IAM-05	Is session management documented?	Yes	14-day idle timeout; nightly sweep; per-session revocation (Security#session-lifecycle )
IAM-06	Are passwords stored in plaintext?	No	Bcrypt for reporter passcodes; magic-link primary for handlers (Security#access-control )

IPY — Interoperability & Portability #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
IPY-01	Can customers export their data?	Yes	Self-service PDF case export in-product; machine-readable bulk export on request during exit (DPA §6.8 )
IPY-02	Are open data formats used for export?	Yes	PDF for case exports; machine-readable formats for bulk export under DPA §6.8
IPY-03	Is API access available for portability?	No	Self-service PDF and bulk export are the documented portability surfaces

IVS — Infrastructure & Virtualization Security #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
IVS-01	Is the Service multi-tenant?	Yes	Multi-tenant at the application layer; isolation enforced by Pundit policies and per-organization scoping at every controller action (Security#access-control )
IVS-02	Is network segmentation in place?	Yes	Production isolated from operator workstation by network boundary; non-production environments hold no production personal data (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
IVS-03	Is malware protection in place for uploaded content?	Yes	ClamAV virus scanning on all uploads before delivery (Security#virus-scanning )

LOG — Logging and Monitoring #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
LOG-01	Are user actions logged?	Yes	Append-only audit trail with timestamp, actor, and action type (Security#audit-and-compliance )
LOG-02	Are logs tamper-evident?	Partially	PostgreSQL triggers reject changes to core audit content and table truncation, and application users cannot edit or selectively delete individual entries. The trail is not hash-chained or WORM-backed, so privileged database intervention remains a documented residual risk (Risk register R-08 )
LOG-03	How long are audit logs retained?	Customer-configurable	Matches case retention (12/24/36/48/60 months); included in PDF case exports for regulatory review
LOG-04	Is application monitoring in place?	Yes	AppSignal instruments the application with session-data transmission disabled and request parameters filtered to preserve reporter anonymity (Subprocessors )
LOG-05	Are clocks synchronized?	Yes	NTP via host OS; all timestamps recorded in UTC

SEF — Security Incident Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
SEF-01	Is a documented incident response plan in place?	Yes	Business continuity plan §3–5 and the Incident register disclosure timeline
SEF-02	Are customers notified of personal data breaches?	Yes	Without undue delay, in any case within 72 hours of awareness (DPA §6.6 )
SEF-03	Is a public incident register maintained?	Yes	Incident register
SEF-04	What is the timeline for incident disclosure?	Tiered	Customers: 72h of awareness; preliminary register entry: 7d post-containment; final entry: 30d post-containment (Incident register )
SEF-05	Is there a responsible-disclosure inbox?	Yes	security@ethicsportal.eu (Security#responsible-disclosure )

STA — Supply Chain Management, Transparency & Accountability #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
STA-01	Is a sub-processor list published?	Yes	Subprocessors with per-row data category, jurisdiction, purpose
STA-02	Are customers notified before sub-processors are added or replaced?	Yes	At least 30 days advance notice (DPA §6.4 )
STA-03	Can customers object to a sub-processor change?	Yes	Right to terminate if no resolution is reached (DPA §6.4 )
STA-04	Are sub-processors bound by data-protection agreements?	Yes	Written DPA in place with each sub-processor under GDPR Art. 28
STA-05	Is AI or LLM processing of customer data disclosed?	Yes (negative)	No LLM, generative-AI, or AI-classifier service is engaged as a sub-processor or used to process report content (DPA §6.10 , Coverage map §5 )
STA-06	Are international data transfers documented?	Yes	Standard Contractual Clauses + safeguards for the single named non-EU sub-processor (Subprocessors , DPA §7 )

TVM — Threat & Vulnerability Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
TVM-01	Are dependencies scanned for vulnerabilities?	Yes	Brakeman (Rails), bundler-audit (Ruby), importmap audit (JavaScript) on every change (Security#dependency-and-patch-management )
TVM-02	Is a vulnerability disclosure program in place?	Yes	Responsible disclosure with documented acknowledgement and remediation SLAs
TVM-03	What is the remediation SLA for vulnerabilities?	Tiered	Critical 7 days, high 30 days, medium 90 days (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
TVM-04	Are penetration tests performed?	No (in treatment)	None currently on record; planned post-revenue (Trust#certification-status , ISO 27001 A.5.35 )

UEM — Universal Endpoint Management #

ID	Question	Answer	Evidence
UEM-01	Are operator endpoints hardened?	Yes	Operator workstation: full-disk encryption, screen-lock, OS auto-update, hardware-key 2FA on production-access accounts (ISO 27001 A.8.1 )
UEM-02	Are mobile devices used for production access?	No	Production access is restricted to the operator’s primary workstation
UEM-03	Is a clear-desk and clear-screen policy in place?	Self-assessed	Operator workstation has automatic screen-lock; clear-desk practice for any printed materials (ISO 27001 A.7.7 )

Available under NDA during procurement review #

The following operational topics are not in this public questionnaire because they contain infrastructure and response detail that is more appropriate for controlled disclosure. They are shared on request during procurement review:

Privileged production-access mechanics (specific accounts, hardware-key type, escalation paths)
Incident-response escalation contacts and on-call rotation
Business-continuity contact tree
Internal vulnerability-response tracker contents
Restore-drill artefacts and timing detail beyond the date

To request these materials, contact support@ethicsportal.eu .

Document control #

Field	Value
Document title	EthicsPortal CAIQ-aligned vendor security questionnaire
Structure	CSA CAIQ v4 domain taxonomy (Audit & Assurance through Universal Endpoint Management)
Version	1.0
Effective date	2026-05-21
Last reviewed	2026-05-21
Next scheduled review	2027-05-21
Owner	Yaroslav Shmarov, operator
Machine-readable copy	caiq-ethicsportal.csv