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CAIQ-aligned vendor security questionnaire #

EthicsPortal publishes pre-filled answers to the questions procurement teams most often ask. The questionnaire is organized by the Cloud Security Alliance’s CAIQ v4 domain taxonomy — the framework most EU enterprise procurement teams use — so an evaluator can place each answer in the domain their own assessment template expects. Where a CCM v4 control statement covers a question, the control is cited alongside it.

This is a vendor-authored answer set, not an attestation by the CSA. The substance is what an external auditor would evaluate; the structure makes it easy to compare against vendors who have been audited.

A downloadable CSV is published at caiq-ethicsportal.csv for ingestion into procurement tools.

Last updated: 2026-10-06.


How to read this page #

FieldMeaning
IDAn EthicsPortal row identifier, stable across revisions. The code before the number is the CAIQ v4 domain; the number is our own sequence within that domain and is not a CCM v4 control number
Related CCM v4The CCM v4 control whose published control statement covers this question, where one does. This is a cross-reference, not a control-level compliance claim: a row answers only the question stated, not the whole control. Blank where no v4 control statement directly covers the question. Some rows map to a control in a different domain, and more than one row may map to the same control
QuestionEthicsPortal’s restatement of the question in the CAIQ domain
AnswerYes, No, Partially, or N/A, with qualifiers where the substance is more useful than a binary — for example No (in treatment) when a control is on the operator’s roadmap, Yes (inherited) when a sub-processor’s certification carries the control, Yes (negative) when the affirmative answer to a “does the Service do X?” question is “no, by design”, or a specific value (24 hours, 99.5% monthly, Nuremberg) where one applies
EvidenceLink to the page or document that contains the substantive answer

Retired rows: EP-AIS-03 and EP-AIS-04 were withdrawn on 2026-10-06 as duplicates of EP-CEK-01 and EP-CEK-02, which answer encryption at rest and in transit. Row IDs are never reused.

Where a question’s answer is operationally sensitive (privileged-access mechanics, incident-response escalation contacts, infrastructure detail beyond what is on /security/ ), the answer here is Available under NDA and is shared during procurement review. This mirrors the posture published on /trust/ .


A&A — Audit & Assurance #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-A&A-01A&A-02Are independent audit or assurance assessments performed on the Service?No (in treatment)ISO 27001 self-assessment and first-party security testing are both published; neither is independent. External audit and penetration test are planned; scope and date are disclosed on /trust/ when either is on record
EP-A&A-02Are audit reports available to customers?No (in treatment)When an independent audit or pen test is on record, scope, date, and remediation summary will be published on /trust/
EP-A&A-03A&A-05Does the organization conduct internal information security reviews?YesAnnual internal audit against ISO/IEC 27001:2022 with every finding published at Internal audit record ; outcomes reviewed and decided at Management review record . The ISO 27001 self-assessment is the audited artifact; security testing passes with findings and remediation are at Self-conducted security testing . Self-performed — a single-operator organization cannot produce an impartial internal audit, and both pages say so
EP-A&A-04Are compliance certifications listed publicly?YesCertification status disclosed on /trust/ (none currently held; structured self-assessment in place)

AIS — Application & Interface Security #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-AIS-01AIS-05Is application security testing performed?YesBrakeman, bundler-audit, importmap audit on every change (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
EP-AIS-02AIS-04Is input validation enforced on all external inputs?YesRails framework defaults (strong parameters, output escaping); application-level checks at every controller boundary (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
EP-AIS-05AIS-02Is the application protected against OWASP Top 10 risks?YesFramework-level defenses (parameterized queries, CSRF, output escaping, strong parameters, encrypted attributes); static analysis (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )

BCR — Business Continuity & Operational Resilience #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-BCR-01BCR-04Is a documented business continuity plan in place?YesBusiness continuity plan
EP-BCR-02BCR-08Are backups encrypted?PartialDaily database dumps are encrypted with GnuPG AES-256 on the host before upload, and the monthly restore drill decrypts one and reads an encrypted column back. The 7-day server snapshots are not encrypted by EthicsPortal; application-encrypted fields remain encrypted in both (Security#backups-and-restore )
EP-BCR-03BCR-08Are backup restores tested?YesMonthly database restore into a scratch environment. The drill does not demonstrate end-to-end RTO; last date is on Security#backups-and-restore
EP-BCR-04BCR-03What is the recovery point objective (RPO)?24 hoursSLA#recovery-objectives
EP-BCR-05BCR-03What is the recovery time objective (RTO)?4 hoursSLA#recovery-objectives
EP-BCR-06Is an availability target published?Yes99.5% monthly for covered surfaces (SLA )
EP-BCR-07BCR-11Is geographic redundancy in place across providers?NoBackups are stored separately from compute within Hetzner; cross-provider redundancy not in place. Trade-off stated in Risk register R-02

CCC — Change Control & Configuration Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-CCC-01CCC-01, CCC-02Are changes managed through a documented process?YesSecurity#secure-development-lifecycle — every change is checked against a written pre-deploy checklist, and the automated suite plus static analysis block the deploy on failure
EP-CCC-02CCC-04Is infrastructure managed as code?YesKamal deployment configuration version-controlled; no out-of-band production changes
EP-CCC-03IVS-05Are production and non-production environments separated?YesProduction is isolated; non-production environments use synthetic fixtures only (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
EP-CCC-04TVM-03Is there a documented vulnerability response timeline?YesCritical 7 days, high 30 days, medium 90 days (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )

CEK — Cryptography, Encryption & Key Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-CEK-01CEK-03Is data at rest encrypted?PartialNon-deterministic Rails ActiveRecord Encryption on defined report, identity and communication fields; daily database dumps encrypted with GnuPG AES-256 before upload; file attachments encrypted with AES-256 under a separate key per file. The server disk is not volume-encrypted, so database fields outside the encrypted set are stored unencrypted on the host (Security#data-encryption )
EP-CEK-02CEK-03Is data in transit encrypted?YesHTTPS/TLS for all connections; unencrypted HTTP redirected (Security#data-encryption )
EP-CEK-03CEK-08Are customer-managed encryption keys (BYOK) supported?NoProcessor-managed keys support the current reporter–handler encryption design. Deletion follows the production and backup lifecycle stated in DPA §§6.8 and 6.11; no instantaneous deletion from every backup copy is claimed.
EP-CEK-04IAM-15Are passwords stored using a one-way hash?YesReporter passcodes bcrypt-hashed and non-recoverable; handler/admin authentication via magic-link plus TOTP, no plaintext password storage
EP-CEK-05CEK-01Is encryption key management documented?PartialApplication field-encryption keys are processor-managed. Account-specific key storage, rotation and supplier access evidence requires procurement review (Security#data-encryption )

DCS — Datacenter Security #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-DCS-01DSP-19Where are data centers located?Nuremberg, Germany (EU); file attachment backup copy in Falkenstein, Germany (EU)Security#infrastructure
EP-DCS-02DCS-07, DCS-09Are data centers under recognized physical-security certification?Yes (inherited)Hetzner data centers under Hetzner’s certification scope (ISO 27001 control map A.7 )
EP-DCS-03DSP-19Is data residency limited to the EU/EEA?Yes for reporting-service dataCore application data, database, and file storage are in Germany. The public marketing site uses Cloudflare in a separate controller context disclosed in the Privacy Notice ; it is not part of the whistleblowing channel or the customer DPA processing chain.

DSP — Data Security & Privacy #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-DSP-01Is a Data Processing Agreement (DPA) available?YesDPA ; signed countersigned copy on request to legal@ethicsportal.eu
EP-DSP-02GRC-07Is the Service GDPR-compliant?YesProcessor under GDPR Art. 28; full coverage on /directive-coverage/ and /dpa/
EP-DSP-03DSP-14Are sub-processors publicly disclosed?YesSubprocessors page lists each, with jurisdiction, purpose, and data categories
EP-DSP-04DSP-16How long is personal data retained?Customer-configurable12, 24, 36, 48, or 60 months after report closure, with automatic deletion (Security#audit-and-compliance )
EP-DSP-05DSP-11, DSP-16Is personal data deleted on customer instruction?YesAfter the Service ends, personal data is returned or deleted at the Controller’s choice; production deletion and backup expiry follow the documented lifecycle (DPA §6.8 )
EP-DSP-06DSP-12Is personal data minimization practiced?YesOnly essential fields are collected; reporter name and contact are optional. Art. 5(1)(c) GDPR (Coverage map §7 )
EP-DSP-07DSP-10, DSP-13Is PII transmitted to any third party for processing?Only to disclosed sub-processorsSubprocessors lists every recipient with the data category. No LLM or AI service is a sub-processor (DPA §6.10 )
EP-DSP-08DSP-11Are data subjects’ rights supported?YesAccess, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, objection (DPA §6.5 )

GRC — Governance, Risk & Compliance #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-GRC-01GRC-01, GRC-05Is there a published information security policy?YesInformation security policy
EP-GRC-02GRC-02Is there a documented risk register?YesRisk register
EP-GRC-03GRC-02Is risk assessed periodically?YesAnnually and on material change (Risk register §Review-cadence )
EP-GRC-04GRC-06Who owns information security at the organization?Operator (named individual)IS policy §4 , Trust#contracting-party
EP-GRC-05GRC-07Is regulatory compliance tracked?YesGDPR, Directive 2019/1937, EAA / EN 301 549 (Directive coverage map , Directive interpretations , Accessibility )

HRS — Human Resources Security #

EthicsPortal has no employees or contractors. Personnel controls below are answered N/A with the compensating arrangements — privileged-access summary available during procurement review, operator self-directed security awareness via subscribed feeds — documented on /trust/ and in ISO 27001 control map A.6 .

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-HRS-01HRS-01Are background checks performed on personnel with access to customer data?N/ANo employees. Operator screening is verifiable through published registry information (Trust#contracting-party )
EP-HRS-02HRS-11Is security awareness training provided to personnel?N/ANo employees. Operator self-directed via Rails security mailing list, CVE feeds, advisory subscriptions
EP-HRS-03HRS-10Are confidentiality agreements in place for personnel?N/ANo employees. Customer-side confidentiality is in DPA §6.2
EP-HRS-04HRS-05, IAM-07Is there a documented offboarding procedure for personnel with system access?N/ANo employees. Customer offboarding is governed by DPA §6.8

IAM — Identity & Access Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-IAM-01IAM-14Is multi-factor authentication available for customer accounts?YesTOTP-based 2FA for handler/admin accounts; reporter accounts use Case ID + bcrypt passcode (two-factor by construction) (Security#access-control )
EP-IAM-02IAM-09, IAM-14Is multi-factor authentication enforced on operator accounts with production access?YesHardware-key 2FA on all operator accounts with production access (ISO 27001 A.8.2 )
EP-IAM-03IAM-05, IAM-16Is role-based access control enforced?YesPundit policies enforced at every controller action; least-privilege defaults (Security#access-control )
EP-IAM-04IAM-08Are access rights reviewed periodically?YesMember-deactivation lifecycle and audit-log review (Security#member-access-and-offboarding )
EP-IAM-05IAM-01Is session management documented?Yes14-day idle timeout; nightly sweep; per-session revocation (Security#session-lifecycle )
EP-IAM-06IAM-15Are passwords stored in plaintext?NoBcrypt for reporter passcodes; magic-link primary for handlers (Security#access-control )

IPY — Interoperability & Portability #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-IPY-01IPY-02, IPY-04Can customers export their data?YesSelf-service PDF case export in-product; machine-readable bulk export on request during exit (DPA §6.8 )
EP-IPY-02IPY-04Are open data formats used for export?YesPDF for case exports; machine-readable formats for bulk export under DPA §6.8
EP-IPY-03IPY-02Is API access available for portability?NoSelf-service PDF and bulk export are the documented portability surfaces

IVS — Infrastructure & Virtualization Security #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-IVS-01IVS-06Is the Service multi-tenant?YesMulti-tenant at the application layer; isolation enforced by Pundit policies and per-organization scoping at every controller action (Security#access-control )
EP-IVS-02IVS-03, IVS-06Is network segmentation in place?YesProduction isolated from operator workstation by network boundary; non-production environments hold no production personal data (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
EP-IVS-03TVM-02Is malware protection in place for uploaded content?YesClamAV virus scanning on all uploads before delivery (Security#virus-scanning )

LOG — Logging and Monitoring #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-LOG-01LOG-07, LOG-08Are user actions logged?YesAppend-only audit trail with timestamp, actor, and action type (Security#audit-and-compliance )
EP-LOG-02IAM-12, LOG-09Are logs tamper-evident?PartiallyPostgreSQL triggers reject changes to core audit content and table truncation, and application users cannot edit or selectively delete individual entries. The trail is not hash-chained or WORM-backed, so privileged database intervention remains a documented residual risk (Risk register R-08 )
EP-LOG-03LOG-02How long are audit logs retained?Customer-configurableMatches case retention (12/24/36/48/60 months); included in PDF case exports for regulatory review
EP-LOG-04LOG-03, LOG-05Is application monitoring in place?YesAppSignal instruments the application with session-data transmission disabled and request parameters filtered to preserve reporter anonymity (Subprocessors )
EP-LOG-05LOG-06Are clocks synchronized?YesNTP via host OS; all timestamps recorded in UTC

SEF — Security Incident Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-SEF-01SEF-03Is a documented incident response plan in place?YesBusiness continuity plan §3–5 and the Incident register disclosure timeline
EP-SEF-02SEF-07Are customers notified of personal data breaches?YesWithout undue delay after awareness (DPA §6.6 )
EP-SEF-03Is a public incident register maintained?YesIncident register
EP-SEF-04SEF-02, SEF-07What is the timeline for incident disclosure?TieredAffected controllers: without undue delay after awareness; preliminary register entry: 7d post-containment; final entry: 30d post-containment (Incident register )
EP-SEF-05Is there a responsible-disclosure inbox?Yessecurity@ethicsportal.eu (Security#responsible-disclosure )

STA — Supply Chain Management, Transparency & Accountability #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-STA-01DSP-14, STA-07Is a sub-processor list published?YesSubprocessors with per-row data category, jurisdiction, purpose
EP-STA-02DSP-14Are customers notified before sub-processors are added or replaced?YesAt least 30 days advance notice (DPA §6.4 )
EP-STA-03STA-09Can customers object to a sub-processor change?YesRight to terminate if no resolution is reached (DPA §6.4 )
EP-STA-04DSP-13, STA-12Are sub-processors bound by data-protection agreements?YesWritten DPA in place with each sub-processor under GDPR Art. 28
EP-STA-05Is AI or LLM processing of customer data disclosed?Yes (negative)No LLM, generative-AI, or AI-classifier service is engaged as a sub-processor or used to process report content (DPA §6.10 , Coverage map §5 )
EP-STA-06DSP-10, DSP-19Are international data transfers documented?YesStandard Contractual Clauses + safeguards for the single named non-EU sub-processor (Subprocessors , DPA §7 )

TVM — Threat & Vulnerability Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-TVM-01TVM-05, TVM-07Are dependencies scanned for vulnerabilities?YesBrakeman (Rails), bundler-audit (Ruby), importmap audit (JavaScript) on every change (Security#dependency-and-patch-management )
EP-TVM-02TVM-01Is a vulnerability disclosure program in place?YesResponsible disclosure with documented acknowledgement and remediation SLAs
EP-TVM-03TVM-03, TVM-08What is the remediation SLA for vulnerabilities?TieredCritical 7 days, high 30 days, medium 90 days (Security#secure-development-lifecycle )
EP-TVM-04TVM-06Are penetration tests performed?No (in treatment)None currently on record; planned, with scope and date published when one is performed (Trust#certification-status , ISO 27001 A.5.35 )

UEM — Universal Endpoint Management #

IDRelated CCM v4QuestionAnswerEvidence
EP-UEM-01UEM-05Are operator endpoints hardened?YesOperator workstation: full-disk encryption, screen-lock, OS auto-update, hardware-key 2FA on production-access accounts (ISO 27001 A.8.1 )
EP-UEM-02UEM-04Are mobile devices used for production access?NoProduction access is restricted to the operator’s primary workstation
EP-UEM-03HRS-03, UEM-06Is a clear-desk and clear-screen policy in place?Self-assessedOperator workstation has automatic screen-lock; clear-desk practice for any printed materials (ISO 27001 A.7.7 )

Available under NDA during procurement review #

The following operational topics are not in this public questionnaire because they contain infrastructure and response detail that is more appropriate for controlled disclosure. They are shared on request during procurement review:

To request these materials, contact support@ethicsportal.eu .


Document control #

FieldValue
Document titleEthicsPortal CAIQ-aligned vendor security questionnaire
StructureCSA CAIQ v4 domain taxonomy (Audit & Assurance through Universal Endpoint Management); row IDs are EthicsPortal’s own, with CCM v4 controls cross-referenced per row where a control statement covers the question
Version1.3
Effective date2026-05-21
Last reviewed2026-10-06
Next scheduled review2027-05-21
OwnerYaroslav Shmarov, operator
Machine-readable copycaiq-ethicsportal.csv